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Abstract
This paper studies how aid for trade (AfT) affects the quality of recipient coun-
tries’ exports. It shows that the quality effect is most discernible for AfT for
assistance in trade policy: a 50% increase in the value of AfT received in this cat-
egory is associated with a 0.5%-1% increase in the quality of exports to the donor
and other OECD countries. On average, the actual AfT received for assistance in
trade policy leads to a 2% upgrade of the recipient country in the quality ladder of
all developing countries. Around half of this quality effect is driven by the quality
improvement of continued products in continued markets (intensive margin), and
the other half by the quality upgrading of new products in continued markets and
existing products in new markets (extensive margin).
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Aid for Trade and the Quality of Exports
1 Introduction
Despite the pivotal role of aid for trade (AfT) in international development assistance,
its impact is only recently assessed with a focus on its effectiveness in promoting the
trade value of the recipients (Caĺı and te Velde, 2011; Helble et al., 2012; Pettersson and
Johansson, 2013; Vijil and Wagner, 2012). This paper investigates the effects of AfT
on trade from a new angle: we study whether and how AfT affects the quality of the
recipient countries’ exports and hence their positions in the global quality ladder.
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, our research adds a new aspect – i.e.
the quality of exports – to the recent AfT effectiveness evaluation literature where AfT is
shown to have some positive but limited impact on trade value (Caĺı and te Velde, 2011;
Helble et al., 2012; Pettersson and Johansson, 2013; Vijil and Wagner, 2012).1 While AfT
funds target specifically at the building of the recipient countries’ supply-side capacity
for deeper integration into the world economy (OECD/WTO, 2007), the expansion of
global value chains presents a new concern for the effectiveness of AfT: in response to the
increasing fragmentation of production across borders, AfT is now being geared toward
the needs for enhancing an aided country’s comparative advantage in the value chain
through the provision of products and services at internationally competitive cost and
quality (Lammersen and Roberts, 2015; OECD/WTO, 2013). Following this rationale,
we first provide an assessment of the impact of AfT on the quality of the recipients’
exports, distinguishing the effects from AfT of different categories as well as the effects
for different export markets. Second, we examine the time pattern of the quality effects
of AfT and look into the intensive and extensive margins along the market and product
dimensions. A close look at the market and product dynamics gives useful information
about the sources of the effects observed, offering a more accurate anatomy and deeper
1Using non-stationary panel estimators, Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2013) find negative but insignificant
impact of general aid (official development assistance which includes AfT) on recipients’ exports to
donors.
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understanding of the workings of AfT in recipient countries.
2 Methodology and Data
A widely used proxy for product quality is product price (or unit value). The main
problem with price as a measure of quality is that it reflects not only quality but also the
markup and productivity of firms. To isolate the “true” quality component from product
prices, we adopt an estimation approach for differentiated products used widely in the
empirical IO literature (e.g. Anderson et al., 1988, 1992). Specifically, we estimate the
following structurally derived equation as in Khandelwal (2010) and Khandelwal et al.
(2013):
ln qijkt + σk ln pijkt = ωjt + ωk + εijkt, (1)
where qijkt is the quantity of product k exported by country i to country j in year t;
pijkt is the price and σk is the elasticity of substitution of the product; the fixed effect
ωjt controls for all market-year-specific characteristics such as income and general price
index; and the fixed effect ωk is introduced to control for all product-specific factors
such as the unit of measurement (e.g. kg, tonne, meter), ensuring the comparability of
quantities and prices across products. The inferred quality can then be recovered from
the residual of the regression as λ̂ijkt = ε̂ijkt/(σk−1). An institutional explanation of this
estimate of quality is as follows. When product prices are the same, consumers would
prefer and buy a larger quantity of higher-quality products. A bigger ε means a higher
quantity of sales q when product prices p are controlled for, hence reflecting a higher
quality λ of the product. To facilitate the following country-country-year-level analysis,
we further construct λ̂ijt as a weight average of λ̂ijkt with the weight being the share of
each product in the export value.2
2There are three problems with country-country-product-year-level regressions. First, because of
the inter-sectoral nature of a great part of AfT (e.g. technical assistance on trade policy) even the
most disaggregated AfT statistics cannot be cleanly aligned with products or industries. Second, such
disaggregated level regressions are computationally very demanding especially with high-dimensional
fixed effects. Third, results of regressions at this level may be driven by the bias from the fact that some
observations are assigned a large weight in the sample simply because some countries happen to export
2
The effect of AfT on the quality of exports is estimated from regressions that take the
following form:
λ̂ijt = α +
∑
m
βmAfTmij,t−s to t−1 +
∑
m
θmOAfTmij,t−s to t−1 + XΓijt + δit + µjt + νijt, (2)
where AfTmij,t−s to t is the log value of AfT from donor j to recipient i, summed from year
t− s to year t− 1; the superscript m denotes one of the three categories of AfT that are
broadly related to trade policy, economic infrastructure, and productive capacity; OAfT
is the sum of AfT from all donors except country j; δit and µjt capture all time-variant
importer and exporter characteristics respectively; X is a vector that contains both time-
variant and -invariant country-pair-specific controls (population weighted distance and
dummies for sharing a common official language, for ever being in a colonial relationship,
and for whether being in a regional trade agreement);3 νijt is the error term and all other
parameters are estimated coefficients.
Our trade data is from CEPII-BACI. All products are defined at 6-digit HS level
(1992 version). The AfT data is obtained from OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
Following Khandelwal et al. (2013), product-specific elasticities of substitution are taken
from Broda et al. (2006) at the median of their multi-country sample.4 Bilateral country
relationship variables are from Agarwal and Wang (2016) who extend the CEPII Gravity
dataset to include more recent years. The period under study is 2002-2010 as complete
AfT records are only available after 2002 (Caĺı and te Velde, 2011). We further restrict
our sample to non-OECD exporters and exclude trade with major non-OECD donors
(China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil) for which aid data is not available in OECD
CRS and the inclusion of these countries would be likely to bias our results.
a great number of varieties to some markets.
3Lee et al. (2015) find that WTO members are more likely to receive AfT than non-members. However,
we do not include WTO membership dummies for countries or a dyadic dummy indicating the common
WTO membership of importing and exporting countries because they would be absorbed by country-year
fixed effects here.
4The Broda et al. (2006) sample reports country-product-specific elasticities of substitution, but the
numbers of countries reported for different products are extremely unbalanced, ranging from 1 to 73.
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3 Results
Following the literature (Caĺı and te Velde, 2011; Helble et al., 2012; Pettersson and
Johansson, 2013), we split AfT into three categories using the broad classification by the
OECD.5 Our baseline results are presented in Table 1, where we allow for longer time
lags for AfT to have effects on exports than in the above studies. Columns (1)-(5) show
that overall AfT in the broadly defined areas of trade policy (“trade policy, regulations,
and trade-related adjustment”) has the largest positive effect on the quality of exports,
and the effect increases when AfT is cumulated over time, implying that the impact takes
time to come into full effect. Interestingly, AfT in trade policy from other OECD donors
also has a markedly strong and statistically positive impact especially when time lags
are taken into account, indicating that some externality may exist between donor and
non-donor markets for the quality effect of AfT. Taken as a whole, the average elasticity
of quality with respect to AfT is between 0.01 to 0.02 within a five-year window, meaning
that a 50% increase in the value of AfT in trade policy would increase export product
quality by 0.5%-1%.
[Table 1 inserted here]
Similarly, AfT in economic infrastructure improves the quality of exports, but the ef-
fects are statistically less significant. AfT used for building productive capacity, however,
has no discernible effect on the quality of exports to the donor, and AfT from the rest of
the OECD members may actually lower the quality of exports to a given donor country.
While the exact causes of this quality “downgrading” effect requires a closer investigation
into the finer content of AfT and the policy transmission channels,6 a possible explana-
tion is that AfT in this category may be “tied” to the procurement from the donor and
thus compete away resources for exporting high-quality goods to other markets.7
5The classification is accessed via OECD website at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/Aid-for-trade-sector-codes.pdf.
6See Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) for a general discussion on the possible causes for the mixed
effects of AfT found in reduced-form analysis.
7See Wagner (2003), Helble et al. (2012), and Pettersson and Johansson (2013), among others, for
more detailed discussions on “tied aid” in trade context.
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Columns (6)-(10) restrict the export destinations to OECD countries only. Now it
emerges that the quality effect of AfT in trade policy gets weaker for recipient-donor
trade with the elasticity falling slightly below 0.01, and the effect disappears for AfT
from other OECD donors. This finding differs from Columns (1)-(5) and the difference
suggests that the cross-market externality of AfT is only limited to non-OECD markets.
The fact that other OECD members do not benefit from this spillover probably signals
some competition among OECD donors in a manner which is consistent with the above-
mentioned “tied aid” hypothesis. The effect of AfT in economic infrastructure basically
still remains insignificant. AfT in productive capacity now improves quality upto four
years down the line but not for other OECD markets, which, when contrasted to Columns
(1)-(5), indicates that more productive-capacity-related AfT leads to exports of higher-
quality products, but this relationship only exists among OECD markets. The negative
externality among OECD donors still persists although it is less precisely estimated with
a much smaller sample.
To see how AfT changes the recipients’ overall positions in the global quality ladder,
we compare their predicted positions with AfT against their predicted positions without
AfT, taken as mean values in normalized scales,8 using the estimated model from Column
(5). As shown in Figure 1, it seems that AfT in trade policy and economic infrastructure
enable most recipients to upgrade their positions in the global (non-OECD) quality ladder
(both by 2% on average),9 while AfT in productive capacity seems much less effective in
raising the recipients’ quality positions (by -2% on average), a finding broadly consistent
with Table 1.
[Figure 1 inserted here]
Table 2 examines the intensive and extensive margins of the quality effect of AfT along
the market and product dimensions, where AfT is cumulated over the past five years.10
8The normalization is constructed as (λ̂ijt − min(λ̂ijt))/(max(λ̂ijt) − min(λ̂ijt).
9Note that the upgrade is less statistically significant for AfT in economic infrastructure judging from
the t-statistics in Table 1.
10The conclusions we have here are not qualitatively sensitive to the measure of AfT in terms of lagged
periods.
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Columns (1) and (5) are simply copied from Table 1 for the ease of comparison. As
opposed to Column (1) where all market-product observations are included, the sample
in Column (4) is trimmed to continued market-product pairs only that appear in all
years of the sample period. Columns (2) and (3) focus on one dimension and consist
of continued markets and continued products respectively. The comparisons of these
columns thus reveal the dynamic sources of the average quality effect of AfT at different
margins. Specifically, estimates in Column (4) reflect the most narrowly defined intensive
margin, i.e. how AfT affects export quality within existing market-product pairs. The
difference between Columns (1) and (2) in sample size reflects the net addition of export
markets by any of the AfT recipients, and the equality of sample size between Columns
(1) and (3) means no new products were added by any exporters in the whole period.
[Table 2 inserted here]
Although we lose some statistical significance in the continued market sample, totally
new markets or products do not affect the quality effect of AfT in trade policy. However,
comparing Column (2) against (4), we see that half of the quality effect of AfT in trade
policy is due to the addition of higher-quality products in continued markets. A similar
pattern is found when contrasting Column (3) to (4), which shows that for continued
products AfT encourages the exports of higher-quality varieties to new markets, and
this also applies to AfT from other OECD donors. When it comes to AfT in economic
infrastructure and productive capacity, most margins do not play a notable role here,
although the quality effect spills over more to newly exported markets. The above findings
concerning AfT in trade policy are robust to the subsample of OECD markets, while
the margins for other categories of AfT now become less prominent. Together, these
observations suggest that AfT causes changes in quality mainly through the expansions
of the ranges of products and markets in the developing world.
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4 Conclusions
We document that aid for trade has some discernible effects on the quality of the recipient
countries’ exports. In particular, a 50% increase in the value of AfT received from a donor
for assistance in trade policy increases the recipient’s export product quality by 0.5%-1%
for exports to both donor and other OECD markets. On average, the actual AfT received
in trade policy raises the relative position of the recipient country in the quality ladder
of all non-OECD countries by 2%. About half of this observed quality upgrading effect
is driven by the fact that AfT raises the quality of existing products in existing markets,
with the other half coming from higher-quality products being added to the continued
markets and higher-quality continued products being exported to new markets. Our
research is subject to limitations and can be extended in several ways. For example,
our reduced-form results do not reveal any information about the policy making process
and transmission channels of AfT; therefore more work needs to be done to open the
“black box” of the causality chain (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). It is also worth
integrating the current estimation with a global value chain analysis to see how exactly
AfT repositions a country’ comparative advantage in the global production network.
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Figure 1. Predicted effects of AfT on recipients’ positions in the global (non-OECD
countries) quality ladder, 2002-2010. Horizontal and vertical axes are the relative positions of
a country in the global quality ladder with and without a specific type of AfT, predicted from
the estimated model in Column (5) of Table 1. Each data point represents a non-OECD
exporter. The symbols of “+” denote countries whose predicted relative positions, ceteris
paribus, upgrade in the ladder because of a specific type of AfT they actually received, and the
symbols of “◦” denote those whose predicted relative positions, ceteris paribus, downgrade or
have no change as a result of a specific type of AfT they were actually granted. The dividing
line between quality ladder upgrading and downgrading (and no change) is the 45◦ diagonal
(dashed line).
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